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Marital Deduction Estate Planning:
Variations on a Classic Theme
JOEL C. DOBRIS*
Recent modifications in the tax laws, brought about by the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, have changed traditional meth-
ods of estate planning. In the pa, limitations on the amount of
the marital deduction at death led to several widely accepted
types of estate plans. Today, with the new unlimited marital de-
duction, these plans have to be modified in order to arrive at
plans which provide maximum tax savings with maximum bene-
fit to the heirs and beneficiaries.
The... wealthy person will seek ways of conferring benefits on his family
and at the same time reducing his tax liability.*"
INTRODUCTION
Property transfers between spouses-marital deduction trans-
fers-which take effect when the first spouse dies are the linchpin
of most tax-oriented estate plans.' Transfers which take effect at
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; B.A. 1963, Yale College;
LL.B. 1966, University of Minnesota. The author wishes to thank Mary E. Olden, of
the Class of 1983, University of California, Davis, School of Law, for her aid in the
preparation of this article. He also wishes to thank the editors of the San Diego
Law Review for providing this opportunity to honor the memory of Professor
Maudsley.
** H. HANBuRy & R. MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUITY 234 (10th ed. 1976).
1. On the benefits of the marital deduction, see generally Ascher & Karti-
ganer, Drafting for the Marital Deduction Under the ERTA of 1981, 8 PROB. NOTES 3
(1982); A.J. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING (4th ed. 1979); . COVEY, THE MARITAL DE-
DUCTION AND THE USE OF FoRmULA PR visIONS (2d ed. 1978); J. ERDwAN, COMPLETE
GUIDE TO THE MARITAL DEDUCTION IN ESTATE PLANNING (1978); UNITED STATES
TRUST COIWANY OF NEW Yonx, PRACTICAL DRAFrING (1982); H. WEINSTOCK, PLAN-
NING AN ESTATE (2d ed. 1982); D. WESTFALL, ESTATE PLANNING LAW & TAXATION
(1981); Blattmachr & Lustgarten, The New Estate Tax Marital Deduction: Many
Questions and Some Answers, 121 TR. & EST. 18 (1982); Durand, Planning Lessons
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death and which are nontaxable because of the estate tax marital
deduction are fundamental because they respond both to the de-
sire to provide for one's spouse2 and to the desire to reduce
taxes.3 Since 1948, to achieve both of these goals, testators have
usually chosen to make use of the estate tax marital deduction. 4
Until 1981 there were two significant limitations on the use of
the marital deduction. First, the amount of the deduction was
limited.5 Second, the surviving spouse had to be given the ulti-
mate power of disposition over the marital deduction property.6
From Marital Deduction Litigation, 104 TR. & EST. 943 (1965); Friedman, Choosing
the Proper Formula Marital Bequest, 58 TAXES 632 (1980); Hastings, Coordinating
the Marital Deduction, Orphan's Deduction and Estate Tax Credits, 14th INST. EsT.
PLAN. 1900 (1980); Kurtz, The Impact of the Revenue Act of 1978 and the 1976 Tax
Reform Act on Estate Tax Marital Deduction Formulas, 64 IowA L. REV. 739 (1979);
Ordower, Tax Act Offers New Choices, 121 Tn. & EST. 35 (1982); Polasky, Marital
Deduction Formula Clauses in Estate Planning-Estate and Income Tax Consider-
ations, 63 MIcH L. REv. 809 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Polasky, Marital Deduc-
tion]; Polasky, Estate Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, 3 TAx CouNs. Q.
1 (1959); [hereinafter cited as Polasky, Estate Tax]; Strauss, Qualified Terminable
Interest Property Offers New Opportunities But Many Problems are Unresolved, 9
EsT. PLAN. 74 (1982); Trapp, Appreciation Depreciation, and Basis in Drafting and
Funding Marital Deduction Formula Bequests, 13th INST. EsT. PLAN . 1300 (1979).
2. See Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH,
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9 (E. Halbach ed. 1977).
3. See Gutierrez, Taxation of Wealth Transmission: Problems and Reforms,
in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 71 (E. Halbach ed. 1977).
4. The marital deduction is allowed for qualifying transfers made by a dece-
dent to a surviving spouse. See LR.C. § 2056(a) (Supp. V 1981). This article as-
sumes that the reader is familiar with the terminology and the practice of estate
planning prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).
5. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a) (1) (B),
95 Stat. 172, 301. From 1948 to 1976 the quantitative limit on the marital deduction
was one half of the decedent's "adjusted gross estate." See LR.C. § 2056(c) (Supp.
1 1948), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat.
1520, 1854. The concept of the adjusted gross estate was an essentially single pur-
pose tool designed to limit the marital deduction. See J. PRICE, CONrmEPORARY
ESTATE PLANNING § 5.2, at 228 (1983). The adjusted gross estate was a decedent's
gross estate minus the decedent's debts, estate administration expenses, and cer-
tain taxes and losses incurred during estate administration that were actually
taken as deductions an the federal estate tax return. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-
l(b) (1958). From 1976 to 1981 the Internal Revenue Code allowed a married per-
son to transfer to a surviving spouse, free of estate tax, the greater of $250,000 or
half of his or her adjusted gross estate. See LR.C. § 2056(c) (Supp. II 1948),
amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1520,
1854. See generally R. CovEy, supra note 1; Kurtz, supra note 1; Polasky, Marital
Deduction, supra note 1; see also J. PRICE, CoNrEMpoRARY ESTATE PLANNING § 5.2,
at 230 (1982); D. WESTFALL, supra note 1, 1 11.03[1] [a] (1981).
6. See LR.C. § 2056(b) (1976), amended by Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(d) (1), 95 Stat. 172, 302-03. Simplifying, section 2056 of
the Internal Revenue Code allows a marital deduction for transfers made by a de-
cedent, to or for the benefit of the decedent's surviving spouse. Outright transfers
at death always qualify. Other transfers must not be disqualified as a "terminable
interest." See IR.C. § 2056(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Some terminable interests
are not disqualified. They are more equal than others. Prior to ERTA the termina-
ble interest rule guaranteed the surviving spouse the ultimate power of disposi-
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The enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)
has changed these limits and thus had a major impact on the es-
tate planning practice.7 ERTA created a marital deduction, unlim-
ited in amount; a new type of terminable interest (an interest in
property over which the surviving spouse does not have the ulti-
mate power of disposition) which qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion; an increase in the unified credit that phases in over the next
five years; and estate tax rates that decrease over the nextfour
years.8
This article focuses on the changes these provisions have
brought about in estate planning for married couples when the
first meaningful transfers take effect at death and are essentially
interspousal in nature.9 This is an appropriate focus since such
tion over the marital deduction property, and there were several safe harbors from
the effect of the terminable interest rule:
1. The spouse could be required to survive for a limited period. LR.C.
§ 2056(b) (3) (1976).
2. The spouse could be given a life estate in and a general power of ap-
pointment over property. LR.C. § 2056(b) (5) (1976).
3. A trust exclusively for the spouse and her estate could be created.
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(c)-2(b) (1) (i), 20.2056(c)-2(b) (1) (ii), 20.2056(c)-
2(b)(1)(iii) (1958).
See generally D. WESTFALL, supra note 1, 12.01-.04.
7. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. Tax
lawyers generally, and tax oriented estates lawyers in particular, take pleasure in
using acronyms. This practice is efficient. It also tends to set them apart from the
nonspecialist. Thus the following appeared in a recent issue of the Trusts and Es-
tates Law Section Newsletter of the New York State Bar Association:
For those of you who don't care to learn all of this jargon, but would like
to turn a few heads during intermission at the next tax seminar, we have
prepared the following phrases which you may commit to memory and
work into your conversations at the appropriate moment-
"Indexing may not be enough to stop that Bracket Creep."
'There may still be a danger in using Q Tips, especially in lieu of
CRATs or CRUs."
"If you ask me, PBCs are a poor substitute for ESOPs, no matter how
you slice them."
"Who is going to enforce Anti-Churning of ACRS, now that Qualified
Woodlands are involved?"
'"at is an Odd Position for one with such a clearly Identified
Straddle."
Thornton, Tax Glossary, N.Y. ST. BA. Ta. AND EsT. L SEC. NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1981
at 6; see also Trachtman, Maximsfor Estate Planners, 1963 U. IL. L.F. 123.
8. See generally Note, The Marital Deduction Changes in the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, 13 TEx. TECH L. REV. 190 (1982) (a student note describing the
marital deduction changes under ERTA). ERTA also enacted a federal disclaimer
standard. See The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L No. 97-34, 95 Stat.
172.
9. For many persons of wealth the first meaningful transfers take place at
death. Thus Professor Westfall has seen fit to entitle an entire part of his estate
planning forms the spine of family estate planning.'0 To discuss
such planning in light of ERTA one must consider credit shelter
provisions, marital formulas, QTI trusts," drafting for simultane-
ous death situations, and standard patterns of drafting.12
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The essence of good estate planning is to provide a sensible
compromise among various factors.13 These factors include,
among others, tax savings, economic security, the opportunity for
survivors to realize their full potential, and a realistic appraisal of
the human frailties of the beneficiaries.14 Some clients will be ex-
tremely concerned about taxes 5 and depart from typical notions
of proper provision for survivors. Some others will ignore taxes
and plan solely for the personal needs of their survivors.16 Just as
the lawyer should be willing to respond to the tax-obsessed client,
she should also be willing to respond to the client who is uncon-
cerned about taxes. 17 Most clients, however, seek a harmonious
resolution of the competing factors.18
Family or human considerations will often take precedence
over tax considerations.19 Such considerations are unaffected by
tax law changes. Survivors should be left financially and emotion-
ally secure.20 Thus, it may be wise to give a particular surviving
spouse all of a decedent's property outright, even though it may
planning treatise "Arrangements Effective Upon Death." D. WESTFAL, supra note
1.
10. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 9.
11. LR.C. §2056(b)(7) (Supp. V 1981) now allows a marital deduction for
"qualified terminable interest property". Lawyers specializing in estate planning
have taken to calling such arrangements "QTIP" trusts. Chesebroughs-Ponds, Inc.
sells a cotton swab under the trademark "Q tip" and is seeking to prevent the use
of the trademark term. Schmedel, Tax Report, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
This article uses the term QTI trusts.
12. Post-ERTA drafting may be less standardized than pre-ERTA drafting.
See UNrrED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 12.
13. See generally J. TRAcHnmAN, EsTATE PLANNING (rev. ed. 1968) (Trachtman
was the dean of sensible estate planning).
14. As to basic tax strategies see . PRICE, supra note 5, §§ 2.27-.32. As to the
humanity of persons involved in estate planning, see T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING
AND DRAFTING OF WLLS AND TRUsTs (2d ed. 1979). For a policy oriented view of
the world of sophisticated estate planning, see Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New
Perspectives on Sophisticated Tax Avoidance, 77 CoL'm. I. REv. 161 (1977).
15. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 371.
16. See J. TRAcHTmAN, supra note 13, at 3; Blattmachr & Lustgarten, Selected
Considerations in Structuring Wills (or Will Substitutes) 121 Tr. & Est. 37, 39
(1982).
17. See generally J. TRAcHm.m, supra note 13 (advice to readers not to glorify
tax avoidance).
18. Id. at 1-3.
19. Id.
20. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 9.
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cost tax dollars.21
Basic tax strategies in estate planning also remain essentially
the same after ERTA.22 They include, as before, five basic strate-
gies: shifting income within the family; reducing the size of the
estate during lifetime; freezing the value of the client's estate;
bypassing the estates of survivors; and deferring the payment of
estate taxes. 2
3
Similarly, the more specialized tax strategies in marital deduc-
tion planning remain the same.24 These include: equalizing the
spouses' estate tax brackets to take full advantage of the progres-
sive rate structure;25 deferring the payment of estate taxes, for a
variety of reasons, until the death of the surviving spouse;26 mak-
ing full use of the unified credit in the estates of both spouses; 27
and delaying current tax liability to take advantage of the more
liberal provisions of ERTA,28 which are being phased in over the
next few years.29 In smaller estates the income tax advantages,
such as basis step-up,3 0 sprinkling income,31 and postmortem in-
come tax planning,3 2 may far exceed estate tax savings.33
21. One must always be wary of what Mr. Trachtman called "overplanning." J.
TRAcHTmAN, supra note 13, at 3.
22. See D. WESTFALL, supra note 1, 12.01-.07.
23. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 2.27, at 97.
24. See id. §§ 5.22-.25.
25. Id. § 5.23 at 265-67; Doussard, Estate Planning After the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, 60 TAxEs 22, 25 (1982).
26. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.24 at 267-68. Deferral is a complex question
which is discussed infra. See Halbach, Inter Spousal Transfers and Ounership Af-
ter ERTA '81, 8 PROB. NOTES 122 (1982).
27. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.25 at 268-70. See generally &. COVEy, supra note
1, at 159-67 (early identification of the realities of credit shelter planning).
28. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.25. See generally Cornfeld, Marital Deduc-
tion. Planning and Drafting, 34 MAJOR TAx PLAN. 1402.1 (1982); Cornfeld, the Use
and Abuse of the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 16th INsT. ON EsT. PLAN. 1 1700,
1702.2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Cornfeld, Unlimited Marital Deduction]; see
also R. COVEY, supra note 1, at 159-67.
29. During the period 1982 to 1987 the unified credit will increase from $62,800
to $192,800. During the period 1982 to 1985 marginal estate tax rates will drop from
70% to 50%. See Halbach, supra note 26, at 123.
30. LRLC. § 1014 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
31. See Wormser, The Problems ofthe Sprinkling Trustee, 2 INsT. ON EST. PLAN.
16 8.500 (1968).
32. See Brackney, Post-Mortem Planning, is Now Estate Planning, 121 TR. &
EsT. 28 (1982); see also Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment in
Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Dobris, Postmortem Tax Planning]; Dobris, Equitable Adjustments in
Postmortem Income Tax Planning: An Unremitting Diet of Warms, 65 IOWA L.
REv. 103 (1979); Solomon, Planning Estates for the Forgotten Middle Class, 16th
And that most basic of will-drafting strategies remains the
same--drafting an instrument that will not require constant revi-
sion. The tools are formula provisions,34 disclaimers, 35 and quali-
fied terminable interest property (QTI) elections. 36
The liberalized credit shelter provisions of ERTA enhance pre-
existing planning techniques. 37 Marital deduction estate planning
after ERTA continues to employ the standard bypass trust (or
save-the-second-tax trust, or B trust) to take full advantage of the
decedent's unified credit.38 That is, tax savings can often be ef-
fected by putting the unified credit amount into a bypass trust.39
Since 1976, gift and estate taxes have been unified.40 A single,
progressive transfer tax is applied to the client's total taxable
transfers made during life and at death.41 A credit against this
transfer tax allows substantial transfers free of tax.42 This credit
increases dramatically from 1982 to 1987. The credit acts, as
before, to "shelter" a corresponding amount of property from
transfer taxes. Thus a citizen dying in 1987, without having made
taxable gifts, will have a unified credit of $192,800 which will "ex-
empt" or "shelter" $600,000.43 And so one can speak in terms of
INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1300 (1982). See generally L NEWMAN & A. KALTER, POST
MORTEM ESTATE PLANNIG (1976).
33. See generally Brackney, supra note 32 (after ERTA, income tax savings
may eclipse estate tax savings).
34. See Polasky, Marital Deduction, supra note 1; Polasky, Estate Tax, supra
note 1.
35. See, e.g., Saunders & Jackson, Use of Disclaimers in Estate Planning Clari-
fied, 6 EsT. PLAN. 32 (1979).
36. See Brackney, supra note 32. For some drafting considerations using the
QTI election see Moore, The New Marital Deduction Qualified Terminable Interest
Trust, Planning and Drafting Considerations, 8 PaOB. NOTES 56 (1982).
37. See R. CovEy, supra note 1, at 159-67.
38. See generally IL WEmNSTocK, supra note 1, §§ 5.1-.39 (a clear explanation of
B trust planning).
39. See generally id. § 4.8.
40. See generally id. § 2.2.
41. See generally id.
42. See generally id. § 2.25.
43. The following chart sets forth in tabular form the increase in the unified
credit and exemption equivalent or credit shelter amount.
Exemption Equivalent







While lifetime gifts absorbing the credit shelter will often make sense, this article
assumes that no gifts have been made, and that the decedent has full access to his
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"credit shelter planning."44
Thus the credit shelter "planner" must immediately face the
question of what to do with the credit shelter amount-the
$600,000 in 1987.
The tax oriented lawyer's answer is automatic: bypass the sur-
viving spouse's estate, usually by use of a classic "bypass trust."45
That trust can give the beneficiary substantial access to income
and principal, as before ERTA, without subjecting trust principal
to transfer taxes when the beneficiary dies. 46
This same credit shelter trust can also be used to save income
and gift taxes for the survivors in the standard pre-ERTA ways.
It can save income taxes if the trustee is given the power to sprin-
lde income among the various income beneficiaries, 47 and it can
save gift and estate taxes for beneficiaries if they are given non-
taxable special powers of appointment.4 8
One can skip the credit shelter trust completely without sacri-
ficing tax savings when the beneficiary does not need a trust and
when he is expected to die with less than $600,000.49
Because this discussion is illustrative rather than comprehen-
sive the following discussion holds certain variables constant.
While lifetime gifts will frequently be advantageous, the discus-
sion assumes that no gifts have been made before death.
For simplicity, much of this article is written on the assumption
that ERTA is fully phased in. That is, the author often assumes it
is 1987 and that a decedent can transfer $600,000 free of estate
tax.5 0
or her exemption equivalent or credit shelter. See Case, Lifetime Gifting Strate-
gies After ERTA, 16th INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1200 (1982).
44. IL COVEY, supra note 1, at 159-67; J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.25; UNITED
STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YoRx, supra note 1, at 5, 11; Ascher & Kartiganer,
supra note 1, at 4; Note, supra note 8, at 203-04. Credit shelter planning is dispos-
ing of the amount sheltered by the unified credit from estate tax in such a manner
that it will not be included in the surviving spouse's estate.
45. See H. TWEED & W. PARsONS, LIFETIME AND TESTAMENTARY ETATE PLAN-
Nin.G 64-65 (8th ed. 1978).
46. See generally H. WnmsTocr, supra note 1, §§ 5.1-.39 (for many couples,
saving the second tax is the lawyer's primary contribution).
47. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 10.18; see also Wormser, supra note 31, 68.500
(1968).
48. .PRICE, spra note 5, § 10.21 at 607-09. See generally H. WEINSTOCK, supra
note 1, § 5.6 (the power of appointment gives added flexibility).
49. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.25 at 268-69.
50. In 1987 and years following, the unified credit of $192,800 will shelter
$600,000 in property. See Case, supra note 43, 1200-1203.
A further complicating factor which this discussion ignores is
the generation-skipping transfer tax.51 That is done for three rea-
sons: considerations of that tax is outside the scope of this article;
there is still some reason to believe it will be repealed;5 2 and this
article assumes that the beneficiary of the credit shelter trust is
the surviving spouse.5 3
THE MARiTAL DEDUCTION
One of the major changes in ERTA was the addition of the un-
limited marital deduction.M Property in any amount can now be
passed to a surviving spouse, either inter vivos or at death, free of
transfer tax.SS In larger estates one would never use the unlimited
marital deduction for the entire estate.56 To do so would waste
the unified credit of the first spouse to die.57 One would always
bypass the surviving spouse's estate to the extent of the credit
shelter amount.58 Thus a wise drafter will put at least the credit
shelter amount, the $600,000 in 1987, into a bypass trust.59 Alter-
natively, it can be given to third parties-the children for exam-
51. LR.C. §§ 2601-2622 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See generally F. CovEy, GENERA-
TION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS IN TRuST (3d ed. 1978) (this is the authoritative discus-
sion of the generation skipping transfer tax).
52. For several decades there has been concern about the fact that skillful
drafting of trusts could keep property insulated from transfer taxation for several
generations. See, e.g., C. SHoup, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 32-49 (1966).
Reform proposals were thwarted, in part, by concerns that an effective tax would
be inequitable in its application. A fair generation skipping transfer tax system
was created but it is perceived by many as too complex. For a period of time it
seemed that the tax would be repealed--arguably a triumph of simplicity over eq-
uity achieved in a complex fashion. At this writing, repeal seems unlikely to the
author. See Commissioner Egger Discusses Issues Facing The Internal Revenue
Service, 121 T. & EST. 10, 12 (1982). On the generation skipping transfer tax, see
R. CovEy, supra note 51, at 1-3. On the question of simplicity, see generally
Halbach, Toward a Simplified System of Law, in LAw AND THE AMERICAN FUTuRE
143-157 (1976), and Simplification Symposium, 34 TAx L, REV. 1, 1-3 (1978).
53. If the credit shelter trust is solely for the benefit of the surviving spouse
during his or her lifetime then it is exempt from the generation skipping transfer
tax. See R. CovEy, supra note 51, at 272. This is quite common. If the credit shel-
ter trust is primarily for the benefit of the surviving spouse it may or may not be
subject to the tax depending on the generation of the other beneficiaries. See id.
at 273.
54. See LR.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The unlimited marital deduction
has enjoyed the support of reformers for a meaningful period of time. See Gutier-
rez, supra note 3, at 75.
55. See LR.C. § 2056 (Supp. V 1981).
56. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 1, at 18-20; see also Blattmachr &
Lustgarten, supra note 16.
57. See Gingiss, Marital Deduction Planning Under ERTA '81, 60 TAXES 269,
275 (1982).
58. See generally H. WENSTOCK, supra note 1, § 4.8 (a useful discussion of by-
pass planning).
59. In very large estates the credit shelter may be absorbed by state death
taxes. Berall, Marital Deduction Planning, 8 PROB. NoTEs 69, 73 (1982); see also
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ple.60 Either disposition makes use of the unified credit and saves
the "second" tax on that amount when the surviving spouse
dies. 61
The enactment of ERTA did not affect basic marital deduction
goals -minimizing the estate taxes for the couple as a unit,6 2 and
providing well for the surviving spouse.63 Prior to 1976 these
goals were usually reached by giving the surviving spouse a maxi-
mum6 marital deduction65 formula 66 gift (outright or in trust)67 of
essentially one-half of the decedent's estate.6a What remained
went into a bypass trust.69
In the years 1976-1981, marital deduction planning remained the
same for wealthy couples.7O For people of more moderate means,
credit shelter planning emerged.71 That is, in 1976-1981, in a very
narrow band of the estate planning client spectrum, it was possi-
ble to maximize tax savings by credit shelter planning. Drafters
used the credit shelter first before using the marital deduction in
order to maximize transfer tax savings for the couple.72 However,
Garlock, Estate Tax Unlimited Marital Deduction Has Limited Advantage in
Larger Estates, 56 J. TAxN 236 (1982).
60. The author believes it is wise to give adult children, who are going to in-
herit great wealth, some money sooner rather than later. This will likely make
their lives more pleasant, and accustom them to being propertied persons.
61. See I TWEED & W. PARSONS, supra note 45, at 64-69.
62. See J. TRAcHTmAN, supra note 13, at 1-3; H. TWEED & W. PARSONS, supra
note 45, at 56.
63. See H. WEINsTociK, supra note 1, §§ 4.1, 5.1-.2.
64. See R. COVEY, supra note 1, at 1.
65. See LPRC. § 2056 (Supp. V 1981).
66. See generally R. CovEY, supra note 1 (a complete discussion of marital
formula clauses).
67. The gift can qualify for the deduction if made outright or if put in the
proper form of trust. See D. WESTFALL, supra note 1, 11 12.01-.04.
68. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFiELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFt TAXA-
TioN 5.06[2] (4th ed. 1978).
69. See H. TWEED & W. PARSONS, supra note 45, at 64-69.
70. See R. CoVEY, supra note 1, at 167-68.
71. Id. at 159-62.
72. During the period 1976-1981 the marital deduction was the "greater" of
$250,000 or one half of the adjusted gross estate, and the credit shelter equivalent
was $175,000. Large estates had sufficient assets to fund both a maximum marital
deduction trust in excess of $250,000 and a bypass trust well in excess of $175,000
(which automatically obtained the $175,000 credit shelter). If the estate was
greater than $425,000, the bypass trust was still sheltered to the extent of $175,000.
In an estate of up to $350,000, full use of the credit shelter of both spouses would
eliminate all estate tax. However, if the maximum marital deduction of $250,000
was left to the surviving spouse by the first to die, and if the survivor died with
$250,000, the survivor's estate would exceed the credit shelter amount by $75,000
because it affected only people of moderate means who ordinarily
do not obtain sophisticated estate planning advice, credit shelter
planning was not closely considered by the estate planning bar
which directs its efforts to larger estates.7 3 In other words, prior
to the enactment of ERTA most planners used the maximum
marital deduction and a bypass trust when planning for prosper-
ous couples. 74 Drafters sought the marital deduction using one of
a few standard drafting patterns.75
After ERTA there is no longer agreement about either how to
save the most taxes or what drafting tools to use.7 6 Now the only
consensus is that one should make full use of the credit shelter.77
That is, in 1987 the first $600,000 should go into a bypass trust or to
the children or other third parties. 78 Beyond that, there is agree-
ment neither on how to save the most taxes nor on which drafting
tools are best.
A major point of discussion is how much of the unlimited mari-
tal deduction to use.7 9 There are three schools of thought:
One-use the unlimited marital deduction to reduce the tax in
the first spouse's estate to zero.8 0 This might be called "reduce-to-
zero" planning.81
Two-use the first spouse's lower estate tax brackets to reduce
the overall estate tax cost of both deaths. 82 This is the equaliza-
and be estate taxable to that extent. See A. CASNER & R. STEIN, ESTATE PLANNiNG
UNDER THE REFoRM AcT OF 1976 128-29 (2d ed. 1978); Dobris, Postmortem Tax Plan.
ning, supra note 32, at 290-93.
73. Arguably, credit shelter planning was for the forgotten middle class. See
Solomon, supra note 32, 1 1300-1305.
74. H. TWEED & W. PARSONS, supra note 45, at 64-65.
75. See R. CovEy, supra note 1, at 8-10.
76. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 1; Ordower, supra note 1;
Strauss, supra note 1.
77. See, e.g., UNrrED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YomK, supra note 1.
78. See generally H. WE sToc, supra note 1, §§ 5.1-. (an overview of bypass
planning).
79. See Backman & Frank, Five Factors to Consider in Determining How Much
of the Unlimited Marital Deduction to Use, 9 EST. PLAN. 194 (1982); Cornfeld, Un-
limited Marital Deduction, supra note 28, 11 1700, 1702; Eubank, ERTA: Estate
Planning Aspects, New Options and Mental Reconditioning, 8 PROB. NOTES 47
(1982 ); Garlock, supra note 59; Halbach, supra note 26; Ordower, supra note 1;
Note, supra note 8, at 204-08.
80. J. PRicE, supra note 5, § 5.24, at 267.
81. As the term "reduce-to-zero" planning is used in this article, the estate of
the first spouse to die uses the full credit shelter in combination with only so
much of the unlimited marital deduction as is required to reduce the first spouse's
estate tax to zero. See J. MANmG, ESTATE PLANNING 41-44 (1980); J. PRiCE, supra
note 5, § 5.24.
82. Dean Price has described the matter in the following manner.
After 1984, when the highest marginal estate tax rate will be 50%, the
largest amount of additional tax that could result from the use of the un-
limited marital deduction is $129,200 if the values remain constant. That
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tion of estate tax brackets (not estates).83 It involves the hereti-
cal idea of paying death taxes sooner than absolutely required.8 4
The bypass trust, or gift, then exceeds the credit shelter in an
amount sufficient to use the first spouse's lower estate tax
brackets.85
The third answer is to make even larger estate taxable transfers
for a variety of reasons.8 6
amount represents the difference between the tentative tax on an estate
of $2.5 million ($1,025,800) and the tentative tax on 2 estates of $1.25 mil-
lion ($448,300 x 2 or $896,600).
J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.24, at 268. The point is made visually in charts in
Halbach, supra note 26, at 123; MacDonald, Coping with ERTA: What Do You Tell
Your Clients? 121 TE. & EST. 37, 40 (1982).
83. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.23; Garlock, supra note 59, at 237-38; Halbach,
supra note 26, at 126-27.
84. See sources cited supra note 79.
85. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.24. After 1984, when the highest rate has dropped
to 50%, the first spouse to die would leave the survivor enough property to put the
first spouse's estate in the 49% bracket. See Halbach, supra note 26, at 127-29.
86. The reasons for making post-1984 taxable transfers that generate a 50% es-
tate tax include: (1) a desire to give beneficiaries property sooner rather than
later (for example, a parent may want children to receive property at a younger
age); (2) a desire to guarantee a transfer in the 50% bracket (if estate tax brackets
can come down they can also go back up); (3) a desire to assure that the income
from the property goes to the non-spouse beneficiaries during the surviving
spouse's life; and (4) a belief that the person who controls the bypass property
will be a better investor (for the family as an economic unit) than the person who
controls the marital deduction property. As will be shown below, once the unified
credit amount has reached its maximum and the highest marginal estate tax rate
has dropped to 50% there is no loss if estate taxes are paid "early" in the estate of
the first spouse. See Halbach, supra note 26.
Simply put, the analysis is as follows: if the first spouse's estate is in the 50%
bracket, and if the second spouse's estate will also be in the 50% bracket, and if
the investment performance will be the same, it makes no direct difference if the
tax is paid in the first or the second estate. The family unit will end up with the
same amount of property after the second spouse's estate pays its estate tam If
taxed in the first estate, the bypass beneficiaries will get only half, but it will not
be taxed in the survivor's estate. If the survivor gets twice as much (and is in the
50% bracket) then it will be halved at the survivor's death and the survivor's bene-
ficiaries will get the same amount as they would if the tax was paid early. It has
been put as follows:
A simple example will illustrate. If the decedent has two dollars over
the ... [49% bracket] mark and they are transferred to the surviving
spouse and that spouse doubled the money before he or she died, then the
second estate would be four dollars larger. After paying an estate tax of
two dollars, the children would end up with two dollars. If, on the other
hand the one dollar (two dollars less one dollar of estate tax) were paid
directly to the children, then on the second spouse's death the funds in
their hands would also have doubled (it is assumed that the same net of
income tax rate of return applies to the children's and spouse's funds)
and they would have the same two dollars.
The majority of testators will choose reduce-to-zero planning.87
This is so because of the powerful appeal of a package which com-
bines paying no taxes with devoting most, if not all, of the dece-
dent's property to the surviving spouse. 88 Because of this appeal,
reduce-to-zero planning deserves special attention. The following
discussion is based on reduce-to-zero planning. Reiterating, this
involves full use of the credit shelter in conjunction with the un-
limited marital deduction for the balance of the estate. Several
drafting tools are available to divide the estate into these two
shares. They are formula clauses,8 9 disclaimers, 90 and QTI
elections.91
Harris, Optimal Use of the Unlimited Estate Tax Marital Deduction, EST. GIFTS &
Tn. J. May-June 1982, at 13, 14. See also sources cited supra note 79.
87. Many lawyers will advise married clients that after obtaining the maxi-
mum credit shelter, the unlimited marital deduction should be used to reduce the
estate tax in the first spouse's estate to zero.
Such planning will be especially popular in the period 1982 through the end of
1986 because estate tax rates will be dropping (until 1985) and the credit shelter
will be increasing (until 1987). If the surviving spouse lives until 1987, substantial
tax savings will be available in the survivor's estate. The primary virtue of reduce-
to-zero planning is tax deferral on spousal assets. The rewards of borrowing the
tax money include increasing opportunities to give away or consume assets and
avoiding (temporarily or permanently) liquidity problems. The primary flaw of
deferral by using the unlimited marital deduction is it throws the surviving
spouse's estate into a higher estate tax bracket. This statement applies both to as-
sets left to the surviving spouse and to income and appreciation attributable to
those original assets.
As indicated in the text, some testators will choose not to reduce the first
spouse's estate tax to zero through the use of the unlimited marital deduction.
Rather, they will choose to put additional funds into the bypass trust and pay an
"unnecessary" estate tax in the first spouse's estate. To the extent the property is
taxed in the first estate in a lower bracket than it would be taxed in the second
estate, this will insulate the additional taxed property and its income and appreci-
ation from the higher tax.
Analysis of the "prepayment" of taxes in the first spouse's estate is ultimately
beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Ordower, supra note 1. A number of
factors must be considered including the life expectancy of the spouse expected to
survive, and the family's investment opportunities. However, it should be noted
that a prepayment transfer is most attractive when it uses the below-50% rates in
the first spouse's estate. That is, after 1986, those testators disposed to prepay-
ment will get the most for their money by giving an additional $1.9 million to the
bypass trust. In 1987, the first $600,000 transferred will pass tax-free; the next $1.9
million will pass at rates going from 37% to 49%. Beyond $2.5 million, savings via
the progressive rate table in the first spouse to die's estate will not be a factor in
the decision.
88. See S. Kuss & B. WEsIn, CCH ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 220 (1982).
89. See generally R. CovEY, supra note 1 (fully explores reduce-to-zero plan-
ning before ERTA).
90. See Brackney, supra note 32.
91. See Strauss, supra note 1.
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FoRMULA DRAFTING
A formula is an abstract expression used to describe a gift.92 It
is a description of a gift in terms external to the actual property
transfer.9 3 A formula allows the drafter to obtain maximum tax
benefits in the face of changing circumstances.9 4 For example,
prior to ERTA this was done by expressing the marital gift in
terms of the maximum marital deduction.9 5 After ERTA one can
describe the credit shelter gift by formula with the balance of the
estate going to the marital gift.96 Alternatively, one can describe
the marital gift by formula and let the balance go to the credit
shelter gift.97 Many drafters are describing the credit shelter gift
by formula and allowing the balance of the estate to constitute
the marital gift9 8
Just as either gift can be the formula gift, there are two kinds of
formulas, the pecuniary and the fractional. 99 A pecuniary formula
gift is a preresiduary gift of a dollar amount expressed in abstract
terms. A simple example is, "I give each person in my employ at
the time of my death $100 for each year of such employment." 0 0
A fractional formula gift is a gift of a fractional interest in a
92. See generally R. COVEY, supra note 1 (a book devoted entirely to formula
clauses).
93. Such a bequest refers to what are called "facts of independent signifi-
cance." See E. SCHOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENT'S
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 13941 (3d ed. 1981).
94. See generally Polasky, Marital Deduction, supra note 1; Polasky, Estate
Tax, supra note 1.
95. See J. MANNING, supra note 81, at 54-56.
96. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.34.
97. Id. § 5.33.
98. See, e.g., UNrED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 20-
37. Lawyers who seek useful forms may wish to look at the following sources,
among others: CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WILL
DRAFTINGS PRACTICE (1982); D. WESTFALL, supra note 1; UNITED STATES TRUST
COMPANY OF NEW YoRy, TRUST & WILL PROVISIONS (1981).
99. There are basically two kinds of formula provisions: the pecuniary
formula clause and the fractional formula clause. Additional categories, both in-
tended and unintended, are also recognized. See R. COVEY, supra note 1, at 122-38;
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YoRK, supra note 1, at 1-14.
100. Cf MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YOmK, WaLLS & TRUST
AGREEMENTS 11 (1978) (the bank form book has a similar form). Mr. Covey's sim-
plified, pre-ERTA, discussion version of a pecuniary provision is as follows:
If my wife shall survive me, I give to her a legacy in an amount equal to
the maximum marital deduction, as finally determined in the Federal es-
tate tax proceeding relating to my estate, reduced by the total of any other
amounts allowed as a marital deduction in said proceeding.
R. COVEY, supra note 1, at 8.
fund, the fraction to be determined at the death of the testator by
the application of the abstract terms.' 0 ' The fund to which the
fraction is applied is usually the residuary estate.10 2 Typically
this type of drafting is reserved for marital deduction planning.
The fraction is again defined by an abstract formula written in
terms of the marital deduction or the credit shelter. 03
The question of which formula should be used-pecuniary or
fractional-has been debated for years.104 After ERTA's enact-
ment there is no agreement among drafters about which is prefer-
able;1 05 each has both positive and negative characteristics. 0 6
Pecuniaries are generally simpler to draft, explain, and admin-
ister.07 However, the gifts described by a pecuniary formula can
be affected by changes in value of estate assets during adminis-
tration. 0 8 That is, the pecuniary can be affected by market
swings.109 In rising markets several things are true."10 Post-
mortem appreciation goes to the residuary, that is, to the share
not described by the formula."' The longer the funding of the
pecuniary is delayed, the more the residuary benefits. This is so
because the pecuniary obligation is then being funded with in-
flated dollars, leaving more for the residuary."12 Finally, funding a
101. Mr. Covey's simplified, pre-ERTA, discussion version of a "true residue"
fractional provision is as follows:
All of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real or personal, of
whatever nature and wherever located remaining after the payment of all
death taxes as directed by Article of this Will, debts, expenses of ad-
ministration and other lawful charg--against my estate I give as follows:
A. If my wife survives me, I give to her a fraction of my said residuary
estate, which fraction shall be of such size that the numerator thereof will
be an amount equal to the maximum marital deduction, as finally deter-
mined in the Federal estate tax proceeding relating to my estate, reduced
by the total of any other amounts allowed as a marital deduction in said
proceeding, and the denominator thereof shall be the value of my said re-
siduary estate, using the values of assets as so determined.
R. CoVEY, supra note 1, at 9-10.
102. See J. LEwis, THE ESTATE TAX 378 (4th ed. 1979).
103. See UNTrED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 1-14.
See generally Kurtz, supra note 1.
104. See, e.g., Covey, The Marital Deduction: When to Use, How to Use, 12 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. . 360 (1977); Friedman, supra note 1; see also J. FARR &
J.WRiGHT, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK § 51 (4th ed. 1979).
105. See UNrrED STATES TRusT COMPANY OF NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 15.
106. See J. MANNING, ESTATE PLANNING 55-58 (2d ed. 1982).
107. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.34.
108. Id.
109. See Durand, supra note 1.
110. The statement in the text assumes that the assets in the estate are rising
in value. As has been said. "Markets do not always rise even in inflationary times.
Furthermore, there are different markets. Real estate can rise in value while
stocks are declining." J. MANNING, supra note 81, at 22.
111. This is so because the pecuniary gift is a pre-residuary dollar amount obli-
gation. See J. MANNiNG, supra note 106, at 48.
112. See Durand, supra note 1.
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pecuniary in kind with appreciated property will trigger capital
gain for the estate." 3
In falling markets, the pecuniary legatee is protected because a
pecuniary gift must be fully funded before the residuary legatee
receives anything." 4 The residuary may, therefore, be dimin-
ished by slow funding in falling markets." 5
By comparison, if a fractional formula is used, both gifts share
in gain or loss." 6 Because the gifts are not of a specific amount,
funding them with appreciated property will not trigger gain or
loss.l17 But administration of estates with fractional gifts is more
complex.n 8
Prior to ERTA the pecuniary formula was more popular."9
Now, however, fractionals are more attractive120 although they are
not clearly superior to pecuniaries.121 It seems a drafter will no
longer be able to use one formula for all clients. 2 2
Assume the drafter has decided to use a pecuniary formula gift
for a particular client. Which gift should be the pecuniary
formula gift-the credit shelter gift or the marital deduction gift?
Before ERTA the pecuniary gift was almost always the marital
gift.123 After ERTA many drafters are making the credit shelter
gift the pecuniary gift.124 In deciding which should be the pecuni-
ary formula gift, the drafter must consider the following, some-
times contradictory, principles.
The smaller gift should always be the pecuniary gift in order to
have a "normal" administration with a substantial residuary es-
tate. 25 The contradictory view is that the marital gift should be
113. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.35, at 280.
114. See Durand, supra note 1.
115. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 16, at 40.
116. S. KEss & B. WESTLN, supra note 88, 223, at 410.
117. Id.
118. Using a fractional formula in a community property state is especially
complicated because of further fractionalization. J. PRICE, supra note 1, § 5.42, at
290.
119. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.32, at 277.
120. See UNrrED STATES TRUST COmPANY OF NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 14.
121. Id. at 14-15.
122. Id. at 15; see also Trachtman, supra note 7.
123. Post-ERTA it can be either. See J. PRICE, upra note 5, § 5.32.
124. See Cornfeld, Unlimited Marital Deduction, supra note 28, 1700, 1704.2.
125. See UNtrED STATES TRuST COmPANY OF NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 5-6, 11-
12; Cornfeld, Unlimited Marital Deduction, supra note 28, 1700, 1704.2. At one
point the typical testator did the important business of his will in the pre-residu-
ary clauses. The residuary clause was a catch-all provision to provide for any
the pecuniary in most cases, in order to "set" the marital gift.126
That assures the surviving spouse a fixed amount in a deteriorat-
ing economy.127 And, in a healthy economy, it automatically allo-
cates post-death appreciation to the credit shelter trust.128 There
it will not be taxed when the survivor dies.129
However, in the post-ERTA world of the unlimited marital de-
duction, a formula marital pecuniary gift may turn out to be quite
large.130 An estate with a large pecuniary bequest and a small re-
siduary estate has a special set of administrative problems.13'
These are funding and leverage problems. 3 2 Funding can be diffi-
cult because a pecuniary legacy is an absolute obligation which
the executor must satisfy133 before transferring assets to the re-
siduary legatees.134 That is, the pecuniary obligation is senior to
the residuary.135 For example, assume the pecuniary bequest is
$2,000,000. The executor owes the legatee $2,000,000, which is a
large obligation. 136 Given a deteriorating market for the assets in
the estate, delay in funding that bequest in kind, or a delay in
raising the cash to fund it, can seriously impair or even wipe out
the residuary. For example, if a pecuniary legacy constitutes
ninety percent of an estate, a ten percent decline in value of es-
tate assets will completely eliminate the residuary. A sophisti-
cated executor can deal with these problems but problems they
remain, nonetheless.13
7
missed property or unanticipated circumstances. See T. ATKINSON, WILLs 756 (2d
ed. 1953). Simplifying, in modem wills one expects to see much, if not the bulk, of
the testator's business done in the residuary clause. It is the pre-residuary be-
quests that often do the unimportant business of the testator. An obvious excep-
tion to the preceding statement is the pre-residuary bequest of a substantial
formula amount designed to maximize opportunities under the Internal Revenue
Code. Other exceptions exist as well.
126. See J. MANNING, supra note 106, at 48.
127. Id. at 49.
128. See UNrrED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEw YoRy supra note 1, at 6.
129. See H. WEINSTOCK, supra note 1, §§ 4.30, 5.2.
130. See UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEw YORK, supra note 98, at 19; I.
WEINSTOCK, supra note 1, § 4.30; Cornfeld, Unlimited Marital Deduction, supra
note 28, 1700, 1704.1.
131. See generally Durand, supra note 1.
132. Id.
133. The statement in the text is, of course, limited to estate assets. See gener-
ally T. ATYINSoN, supra note 125, at 754-56.
134. See J. MANNING, supra note 106, at 48-49.
135. See T. ATKISON, supra note 125, at 754-56.
136. See H. WEINSTOCK, supra note 1, § 4.30, at 69. In the absence of authoriza-
tion in the will or in local law, the obligation must be satisfied in cash and not in
kind. See id. For an example of such an authorization, see H. TWEED & W. PAR-
SONS, supra note 45, at 128.
137. See Durand, supra note 1; see also Tarbox, 28 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia
of N.Y. Practice § 170:13 (1968); Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 16, at 40.
The author has the following comments on the fiduciary problems associated
with large pecuniary formula bequests. Large (in all likelihood, unlimited marital
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Similarly, the drafter who has decided to use the fractional
deduction) pecuniary bequests can create problems in estate administration. As
stated in the text these problems are known and can be dealt with to a certain ex-
tent. The following assumes the pecuniary formula bequest is going to the surviv-
ing spouse, and that a "true worth" clause is being used (a true worth clause is
one which allows funding a pecuniary bequest in kind and requires using date of
distribution funding values).
The basic problems are as follows: in up markets for estate assets, or in periods
of general inflation affecting estate assets, delay in funding leads to the transfer of
less value to the pecuniary legatee (surviving spouse) and more value to the by-
pass trust. That is, the dollar amount received by the pecuniary legatee remains
as specified in the will. That dollar amount, due to inflation, is discharged with
fewer assets. The benefit of the difference accrues to the residuary. In a "happy
family" where the survivor is satisfied with the bypass terms, this is a way to save
death taxes in the survivor's estate. The less the survivor gets, the lower the sec-
ond estate tax. Where conflicts exist, delay in funding the surviving spouse's gift
(which costs the survivor investment appreciation) may cause problems. J. MAN-
NING, supra note 81, at 34-35. In up markets, delayed funding will also be likely to
lead to funding pecuniary obligations with appreciated assets which will in turn
lead to the recognition of capital gain by the estate. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-
4(a) (3) (1960). This will diminish residuary legatees who must pay the capital
gains tax.
In down markets, or periods of deflation, delayed funding of large pecuniary be-
quests may wipe out the residuary estate. This is so because pre-residuary pecu-
niary gifts must be satisfied before residuary legacies.
A variety of solutions exist. An executor can be encouraged to take risks (to a
limited extent) by inserting language in the will exonerating him from all liability
except that caused by gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
The executor can liquidate virtually the entire estate to meet the pecuniary obli-
gation. This will protect the beneficiaries, especially the residuary, against defla-
tion, but will give up access to appreciation during administration, and may create
other problems as well.
The executor can make a very large partial distribution on account of the pecu-
niary legacy. This will shift the market risk of the value distributed to the pecuni-
ary legatee, but will sacrifice the goal of postmortem increase going to the bypass
trust.
All adult beneficiaries can be asked to approve the proposed funding plans of
the executor, release him from liability, and agree to indemnify him against all
losses. To the extent such instruments are based on full disclosure, do not consti-
tute overreaching, are not against public policy, and do not constitute the con-
structive distribution of assets for tax purposes, this may work to induce a
conservative executor to adopt an adventurous and tax-oriented postmortem plan.
The surviving spouse can be appointed the sole executor if the expectation is an
up market where slow funding will reduce the postmortem appreciation of the pe-
cuniary legacy. If the survivor is the sole beneficiary of the marital deduction gift,
and if the survivor as sole executor chooses to "injure" himself by slow funding,
there can be no complaint. However, if the survivor as sole executor is slow to
fund and the estate values go down, then the residuary legatees are the injured
parties and the spouse is open to surcharge. See J. MANNmG, supra note 81, at 33-
36. See generally Durand, supra note 1.
It may be that drafters will turn to the pecuniary minimum worth, marital
formula clause. See UNrrED STATES TRusT CoMPANY OF NEW YoR, supra note 1,
at 7-9. The most exotic of marital deduction beasts is a pecuniary formula bequest
formula for a particular client must decide which gift is defined by
the fraction.138 The author recommends a credit shelter fraction
because it is more straightforward.139
QTI TRUSTS
Assume it has been decided to divide the estate, by whatever
method, into marital deduction and credit shelter shares. The
next question is theform of the marital deduction gift. There are
five basic ways to obtain the marital deduction. Three of them ex-
isted before ERTA. They are outright gifts, life-interest-power-of-
appointment trusts, and estate trusts.140 ERTA has added two
more. They are qualified terminable interest (or QTI) trusts,141
and qualified charitable remainder trusts.142 Of these two, only
QTIs will be discussed here.14s
Generally speaking, the marital deduction is not allowed for so-
called terminable interests. 4 4 There were pre-ERTA excep-
tions.145 And ERTA now allows a marital deduction for certain
"qualified" terminable interests. 4 6 To simplify, ERTA allows a
marital deduction for property interests (typically trusts) if:
(1) the surviving spouse has a life interest; (2) no one else has
any interest in the property during the survivor's life; (3) no one
which allows funding in kind at the lower of income tax basis (estate tax value) or
date of distribution value. This puts a floor (a minimum worth) but no ceiling on
the bequest, and avoids the recognition of capital gain if the bequest is funded
with assets which have appreciated. It can also be used for a pecuniary credit
shelter bequest.
138. See Keydel, Estate and Gift Tax Changes Made by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, 17 REAL PRoP. PROB. & TR. J. 18, 36 (1982).
139. A credit shelter fraction is more straightforward because it involves a more
easily determinable amount. For a form of such a provision, see UNITED STATES
TRUST COMMANY OF NEW YoRic, supra note 98, at 46.
140. See D. WEsTFALT, supra note 1, 12.01-.04.
141. See Strauss, supra note 1.
142. ERTA allows the first spouse to die to obtain a marital deduction for a QTI
in which a charity is the remainder beneficiary (a QTI for charity). ERTA also al-
lows a mixed marital and charitable deduction for both a charitable remainder an-
nuity trust in which the surviving spouse is the annuitant and a charitable
remainder unitrust in which the surviving spouse is the unitrust beneficiary. If
the trust is a QTI for charity it qualifies at the executor's election for the marital
deduction under I.R.C. § 2056(b) (7) (Supp. V 1981). If the trust is a "Q-Crat" or
"Q-Crut" then the income interest alone automatically qualifies for the marital de-
duction under LR.C. § 2056(b) (8) (Supp. V 1981) and the remainder for the chari-
table deduction under I.R.C. § 2055 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Thus the death of the
surviving spouse who has a Q-Crat or Q-Crut is a nonevent for estate tax
purposes.
143. Q-Crats and Q-Cruts are beyond the scope of this article.
144. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.10, at 239; see I.P.C. § 2056(b) (1) (1976).
145. Pre-ERTA there were several safe harbors from the effect of the termina-
ble interest rule. See supra note 6.
146. LRC. § 2056(b) (7) (Supp. V 1981). An income interest in a "qualified char-
itable remainder trust" may be created. Id. § 2056(b) (8).
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(including the spouse) has any power during the survivor's life to
appoint trust property to anyone except the surviving spouse;
and, (4) marital deduction treatment is elected by the deceased
spouse's executor.147
The marital deduction is available for the full value of the prop-
erty covered by the QTI election, 4 8 even though the spouse may
receive as little as an income interest in that property.149 At the
survivor's death, the property covered by the QTI election is in-
cluded in the survivor's estate.150 The estate tax attributable to
the QTI property is payable by the QTI remainder beneficiaries' 5 '
unless the surviving spouse's will states otherwise.152
Thus, when the client does not want to leave the marital gift
outright, a QTI trust is an alternative to the old life-interest-
power-of-appointment trust.153 These new arrangements are
proving to be extremely popular,154 arguably for one reason-the
QTI allows the first spouse to die to impose dramatic restraints on
the gift to the surviving spouse and still obtain the marital deduc-
tion. 55 One assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that in the current so-
147. See id. § 2056(b) (7). Pre-ERTA contractual wills inevitably lost the marital
deduction because they created terminable interests. See Estate of Opal v. Com-
missioner, 450 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971). Post-ERTA contractual wills are likely to
create interests which can be qualified for the QTI election. See J. PRICE, supra
note 5, § 5.10, at 242. The contractual will is usually used by unsophisticated law-
yers. Thus prosperous persons who go to unsophisticated lawyers and get con-
tractual wills will now have access to the marital deduction. This is an arguably
unintended ERTA reform. See generally B. SPARKS, CoNmTPcrs To MAKE WmLs
(1956).
148. J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.18; see I-TLC. § 2056(a) (b) (7) (Supp. V 1981).
149. J. PIcE, supra note 5, § 5.18; see I.R.C. § 2056(b) (7) (Supp. V 1981).
150. R.C. § 2044 (Supp. V 1981). See Ascher & Kartiganer, supra note 1, at 4.
151. I.R.C. § 2207A(a) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
152. Id. § 2207A(a) (2); see also Dobris, Postmortem Tax Planning, supra note
32, at 316-17 (intent of testator determines allocation of death taxes).
153. LR.C. § 2056(b) (5) (1976).
154. E.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 74. In drafting QTI provisions the wise
drafter will be sensible and not seek to obtain every last dollar out of the QTI de-
vice. A pattern in marital deductions estate planning has developed: when the
law changes a general consensus emerges about how to obtain the benefits avail-
able under the new statute. Some lawyers then go on to seek the marginal last-
dollar benefits. It seems fairly safe to predict that there is very substantial risk in
seeking those last benefits. It was such thinking that led to the promulgation of
Rev. Proc. 64-19 (1964-1 C.3 682). See Trachtman, supra note 7, at 126.
155. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 74. Oversimplifying, and writing subjectively,
for centuries much property has been in the name of men. Husbands have often
provided at death for their wives by putting substantial amounts of property into
trust. At the death of the widow the property would often go to the issue of the
marriage. See Leach, Planning and Drafting a Will, 27 B.U.L. REv. 157, 180-81
cial climate few people die married to spouses they actively
dislike. Such constraints, however, may be particularly appealing
(1947). In 1948, the marital deduction was enacted in response to the growing
movement to introduce community property regimes into the common law states,
which was in turn a response to the growing impact of the essentially 20th century
American transfer tax system. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.2 at 229; T. SHAFFER,
supra note 14, at 118. Prior to the marital deduction, most wealthy first-to-die
spouses (usually husbands) left their property in trust for the benefit of the sur-
viving spouse (usually the wife). Before there was an estate tax (i.e. pre-1916),
this was done because it was what most people wanted or at least expected.
Kales, The Will of an English Gentleman of Moderate Fortune, 19 GREEN BAG 214,
218 (1907). It accorded with the beliefs of many people that women needed the
protection of trusts and it guaranteed that the property would go to the issue of
the marriage. See J. SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 269. Moreover, under the estate
tax as it existed before 1948 it made sense from a tax viewpoint to make such an
arrangement because at the death of the surviving spouse nothing was included in
his or her estate. It constituted classic "save-the-second-tax-trust" planning.
Thus, prior to the enactment of the estate tax in 1916, the income-to-the-wife-for-
life trust responded to the patriarchal notions of male testators. After the enact-
ment of the estate tax, the tax system reinforced this pattern by responding to the
trust as a save-the-second-tax device.
In the Revenue Act of 1948, a series of changes in the tax law were enacted to
replicate the effect of community property under the tax system. For the first time
there was an incentive to give the surviving spouse (often a widow) something
akin to full ownership of a meaningful portion of the husband's property. That is,
in order to obtain post-1948 tax benefits one had to give the surviving spouse a
power of disposition over the property. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.2
As a result, from 1948 to 1981, the centuries-old pattern of husbands leaving their
wives income interests in property (or income plus some access to principal) was
disturbed by the tax incentive of the marital deduction as it existed during that
period. ERTA has increased the marital deduction but it has made it available to
testators who choose the centuries-old income-only trust. It can be argued that
the drafting patterns of the period 1948 to 1981 where surviving spouses (so often
widows) were given meaningful access to property of the marriage were aberra-
tions from a centuries-old pattern of estate planning.
It will be interesting to see whether ERTA signals a permanent return to the
pattern of entrusting the property of widows. At least one author assumes the use
of QTI trusts will be very limited. See Peckham, New Estate Planning Techniques
For Small and Medium Sized Estates, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 514, 515 (1982).
It is interesting to speculate on the inspiration for the congressional response to
the states' movement toward community property. The Revenue Act of 1948
benefitted the societal position of women as surviving spouses by encouraging at
death transfers to them over which they had the ultimate power of disposition.
However, had the Act not been passed, more sweeping changes favoring commu-
nity property-type control at the state level might have followed. One might ask
the question: was the congressional response based on a desire to prevent women
from owning half of the marital property in America? The answer is probably not.
The likelier explanation is one of legal process. Presumably, the conversion of the
property system of most of the American states to community property was un-
derstood as being too much for the social system to absorb. Conversion from a
common-law system to a community-property system throughout the country
would have been achieved only at great cost of time and energy.
ERTA's arguable retreat from inchoate feminism in the estate tax might be part
of a more general step back in our society as arguably witnessed in a recent article
of special interest. Bolotin, Voices From the Post-Feminist Generation, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 28.
The author believes that the observations in this footnote are accurate. To the
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to a testator who has children by a previous marriage156 or who is
concerned that the survivor may remarry and frustrate an estate
plan previously agreed upon. 57 Moreover, there will be many tes-
tators who believe their spouses need the protection of a con-
straining trust.158
As drafters, lawyers will have to help their clients decide
whether the QTI is going to be mean or generous.159 The mini-
mum QTI need provide nothing more than income to the surviv-
ing spouse for life.160 This minimum QTI is not a very handsome
provision for a survivor. Most testators will probably add addi-
tional lifetime access.161
At death, the QTI property could pass as directed by the terms
of the will of the first spouse to die.l Alternatively, the survivor
could be given a special testamentary power of appointment, as
limited or as broad as the first spouse desires. 163
Lawyers have a professional responsibility to offer wise coun-
extent that they demonstrate injustices in our society, it is his hope that those in-
justices will soon be made right.
While the statements in this footnote lack empirical verification, they demon-
strate perceived wisdom and experience and are likely to be correct. See gener-
ally Friedman, supra note 2 (intestacy statutes as the "DNA" of our society); see
also DEATH, TAXES AND FAmLY PROPERTY (E. Halbach Jr. ed. 1977). In a sense
this footnote is about the question of whether the QTI trust will replace the in-
come-for-life general-power-of-appointment trust. LR.C. § 2056(b) (5) (1976).
Pre-ERTA, most testators who sought the marital deduction via a trust put the
spouse's share into a trust which at least gave the survivor income for life and a
general power of appointment, usually exercisable at death. Post-ERTA, those
who wish to give to the survivor party outright will continue to do so. Those who
wish to use a trust will theoretically now choose between the old power-of-ap-
pointment trust and the new QTI trust.
The QTI is likely to become the trust of choice for several reasons. The lure of
the newest things is likely to prove irresistible to many tax-oriented clients. As
discussed, the QTI allows the first spouse to die to impose dramatic restraints on
property left to the surviving spouse and still obtain the marital deduction. The
after-death flexibility of the QTI executor's election is very useful. The surviving
spouse can be given a special power of appointment which will not be subject to
the claims of his or her creditors.
156. See Peckham, supra note 155, at 515.
157. See H. WEiNSTOC, supra note 1, § 4.20-.24.
158. See J. MANNING, supra note 81, at 46-47.
159. See generally Trachtman, A Credo for Estate Lawyers, 100 TA. & EST. 871,
873 (1961) ('the testator is inexperienced-he has never died before").
160. See I.R.C. § 2056(b) (7) (Supp. V 1981).
161. That might include a power in the trustee to invade principal for the
spouse and/or a power in the spouse to withdraw principal during life, subject to
an ascertainable standard.
162. See Strauss, supra note 1.
163. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.18.
sel. 64 Although each lawyer must decide how strongly to urge
the case for generous treatment of the survivor, one hopes that all
clients will be advised to use the QTI trust in a generous, and not
a mean, fashion.165
The QTI provisions of ERTA create a variety of new coordina-
tion and drafting problems for estate planners. 166 A primary con-
cern is coordination between QTI marital deduction gifts and
credit shelter provisions.167 As already indicated, the primary
tools for coordination are formulas, disclaimers, and QTT elec-
tions. Formulas have been used for some time to divide estates
into marital and nonmarital shares.168 These formulas are still
very useful with QTI property, as a formula gift may be put into a
QTI trust. A disclaimer-an unqualified refusal to accept an in-
terest in property-has also been used for many years as a tool in
flexible postmortem estate planning.169 Initially a state law con-
cept, disclaimers are now governed for federal transfer tax pur-
poses by a federal standard enacted in ERTA.170 ERTA has also
dramatically increased their usefulness.' 71 An estate tax rate
which decreases over the next several years and a unified credit
which increases over several years make postmortem flexibility
all the more important.17 2 And disclaimers allow reduce-to-zero
planning decisions to be postponed until the first spouse's
death.173
One application of this very valuable tool is coordination of the
marital deduction gift in QTI form and the credit shelter disposi-
tion.174 Assume a testator has established a QTI plan which re-
lies on a disclaimer for coordination of the marital deduction
transfer and the credit shelter gift.17s Then the testator would
leave essentially all of his or her property to the QTI trust and fol-
164. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 2.1 (PROPOSED FINAL
DRAwr 1981).
165. See generally B. PARTRIDGE, COUNTRY LAWYER 237 (1939).
166. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.18. H. WEINsTOcK, supra note 1, § 4.20-.24.
167. See Strauss, supra note 1.
168. See generally R. CovEy, supra note 1 (detailed discussion of formula
clauses).
169. See generally L. NEwMAN & A. KALTE, POSTMORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 11-
47 (1976).
170. I.R.C. § 2518(c) (3) (Supp. V 1981).
171. See Moore, The New Marital Deduction Qualified Terminable Interest
Trust Planning and Drafting Considerations, 16th INST. ON EST. PLAN. 11 900, 906
(1982).
172. See generally J. PRICE, supra note 5, §§ 12.26-.29 (explanations of
disclaimers).
173. See Melvoin, Disclaimers: The 1ime Is Ripe, But Is It Reasonable?, 16th
INST. ON EST. PLAN. 400, 404 (1982).
174. See id. 404.2.
175. See id.
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low with a credit shelter trust to receive any disclaimed prop-
erty.17 6 Since a surviving spouse can disclaim part or all of a QTI
trust17 7 the disclaimed QTI property, by the terms of the will,
could pass in the desired amount into the credit shelter trust.178
QTI elections are another tool for postmortem coordination be-
tween marital deduction and credit shelter provisions.179 The QTI
election is a creation of ERTA.180 It allows the executor of the first
spouse to die to elect marital deduction treatment for all or part
of otherwise qualifying property.181 An executor can thus elect
QTI treatment for part of a single trust, with the remainder of the
trust passing tax free under the credit shelter disposition. 18 2
Another facet of QTIs--death tax apportionment-must also be
handled with care.183 Several points should be noted. As with all
marital deduction transfers, death taxes, if any, in the first
spouse's estate should not be allocated to the marital portion.
This will avoid circular tax-on-tax computations.184 In the survi-
176. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 16, at 38-39.
177. Id.
178. However, the survivor must have no power over that disclaimer trust, or
the government will seek to tax the disclaimed property in her estate also. See
Proposed Regs. § 25.2518-2(e) (2).
179. See Moore, supra note 171, 904.
180. L.LC. § 2056(b) (7) (B) (i) (III), (v) (Supp. V 1981).
181. The author believes that most QTI elections will take place under the fol-
lowing circumstances. First is the situation where a sophisticated lawyer has
drafted a formula will which creates two transfers-the credit shelter transfer and
the marital deduction QTI transfer. The executor, as part of a prearranged reduce-
to-zero plan, will elect marital deduction QTI treatment for the QTI trust. Second
is the situation where a sophisticated lawyer has created a single trust for the sur-
viving spouse with the idea that the executor of the first spouse to die will elect
partial QTI treatment in a manner designed to maximize credit shelter and re-
duce-to-zero planning opportunities. Third is the situation where the testator has
obtained unsophisticated advice and has simply created a trust for the surviving
spouse which happens to qualify for QTI treatment. Then the executor has the
same opportunity as the executor in the second situation to elect QTI treatment if
he or she becomes aware of the tax subtleties. To the extent that the QTI election
has the effect of allowing persons with unsophisticated lawyers to obtain a marital
deduction, it is good. Any tax rule that places a premium on obtaining sophisti-
cated counsel is presumptively unwholesome.
182. In temporary regulations the government has made it clear it will accept
partial QTI elections under a single trust. Temp. Reg. T.D. 7833, 1982-43 L1LB. 802
(promulgating § 22.2056-1 (1982)).
183. See generally Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 16, at 42; Keydel, supra
note 138, at 51-52; Moore, supra note 171, 908; Mulligan, Drafting Marital Deduc-
tion Formula Clauses After ERTA to Achieve Maximum Tax Savings, 57 J. OF
TAX'N 362, 367-68 (1982); Suter, Techniques to Apportion Estate Taxes Will Have to
be Reviewed Due to the New Tax Law, 9 EST. PLAN. 96 (1982).
184. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 16, at 42-43. In the estate of the
vor's estate, ERTA allocates the estate tax on QTI assets to the
QTI remainder beneficiaries.185 That tax is paid at the survivor's
marginal estate tax rate.186 In the interest of certainty and effi-
ciency it would be wise to empower the QTI trustee to pay those
taxes directly.187 That way the executor of the surviving spouse
can arrange with the QTI trustee, rather than with the QTI benefi-
ciaries, for payment of the estate tax attributable to the QT[
trust.188 The surviving spouse can, by will, exonerate the QTI
trust from paying any taxes. 89
State death taxes may also affect QTI planning.190 The law is
some states has not kept up with ERTA.191 The drafter must be
sure that a QTI trust obtains the marital deduction in the testa-
tor's domiciliary jurisdiction.192 In some states it may be neces-
sary to forgo QTI drafting to the extent of the state marital
deduction.193
State fiduciary law may also affect the executor's QTI elec-
first to die, if it is expected that the executor may elect to qualify only part of the
QTI trust, then the death taxes, if any, should be allocated against the not quali-
fied (or estate taxable) portion to avoid circular tax-on-tax calculations. M. ANDRE-
SEN, ESTATE TAXEs AND TAx-ExEmr REsmuEs (1962).
In an estate which will or may incur some estate tax, the drafter should not
make the taxes payable from the marital deduction share. Allocating them to the
marital share results in so called "circular tax-on-tax" computations. That is,
amounts left to the marital share are deductible (pass free of estate tax) only be-
cause they pass to a surviving spouse. When any part of the marital share is used
to pay taxes, it fails that qualification and itself incurs tax. That portion used to
pay the tax incurred by the initial tax amount also will then incur yet more tax, ad
infinitum. Rather than being circular, the result is calculating the tax incurred by
ever-diminishing amounts used to pay tax. This headache can be avoided by the
executor by not allocating tax to the marital share.
185. LR.C. § 2207A (Supp. V 1981); see Moore, supra note 171, 1 908.
186. I.LC. § 2207A (Supp. V 1981); see J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.18, at 259-60.
187. Keydel, supra note 138; Mulligan, supra note 183, at 367-70.
188. See Keydel, supra note 138; Mulligan supra note 183, at 368. That should
avoid problems of dealing with hostile or unbusinesslike beneficiaries.
189. See Mulligan, supra note 183, at 367-70. Presumably the surviving spouse
cannot direct in his or her will that death taxes not attributable to the QTI trust be
assessed against it. Moore, supra note 171, 1 908.
190. See Moore, supra note 171, 1 903.
191. See, e.g., UNITED STATES TRUST COMAY OF NEW YORK, supra note 98, at
25-26; Garlock, supra note 59, at 239-40; McCaffrey & Kalick, Estate Planning,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1982, at 1, coL 1.
192. See, e.g., Garlock, supra note 59, at 239-40.
193. For example, in New York there was a 50% marital deduction for which
QTI trusts did not qualify. Then, a drafter might have used a credit shelter be-
quest, a pre-ERTA 50% marital deduction trust, and then a QTI trust only for the
balance which would be subject to state death tax irrespective of form. See
UNrrED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, supra note 98, at 25-26; Garlock,
supra note 59, at 239-40; McCaffrey & Kalick, supra note 191. See generally
Blattmachr, N.Y. Conforms to U.S. Rules For Estate and Gift Taxes, N.Y.UJ., Dec.
27, 1982, at 1, col. 2 (discussion of recent changes in New York law).
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tion.194 He may have a duty to minimize estate taxes in the first
spouse's estate.195 This might require him to elect full QTI treat-
ment in the first spouse's estate of all property above the credit
shelter amount, that is, "reduce-to-zero." He might save tax dol-
lars for the family unit, however, by paying lower bracket taxes in
the first estate.196 The QTI executor should be given broad pow-
ers to deal flexibly with the QTT election.197
Finally, it is to be noted that a spouse must receive all the in-
come from the QTI.198 The rule must be satisfied, as in every
other year, in the year of the survivor's death.199 Thus, the trust
should provide that the accrued, but undistributed, income go to
the survivor's estate (or that the income be subject to a general
power of appointment).200
This discussion of the QTJ would be incomplete without a brief
reference to conflicts of interest20 and questions of professional
responsibility.202 Prior to ERTA, testators who wanted the mari-
194. See generally Moore, supra note 171, 910; Strauss, supra note 1, at 79. If a
beneficiary is harmed financially by a QTI election, is the beneficiary entitled to
either an equitable adjustment or to surcharge the executor? To date, no equita-
ble adjustments are available for inequities imposed in apportioning death taxes.
See generally Dobris, Postmorten Tax Planning, supra note 32.
There will be a surcharge only if the executor has acted improperly or has made
a gross error in postmortem tax planning. Given the newness of the QTI election,
almost any plausible explanation of why the particular election or non-election
was made (or the inevitably safe decision to claim the marital deduction) will
likely save the QTI executor from liability. Indeed without special language in the
will the executor may have a duty to elect the marital deduction to save estate
taxes. See generally Comment, Surcharging an Executor for Negligent Adminis-
tration of Tax Responsibilities, 45 TEMP. LQ. 42 (1971).
195. See, e.g., In re First National Bank of Mansfield, 37 Ohio St. 2d 60, 307
N.E.2d 23 (1974).
196. See, e.g., Ordower, supra note 1.
197. For an example of such flexible powers, see CAIIFORNIA CONTINUING EDU-
CATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING PRACTICE § 6.52 (1982); UNITED
STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YoRx, supra note 98, at 25.
198. I.R.C. § 2056(b) (7) (B) (i), (ii) (Supp. V 1981).
199. Id.; see also Moore, supra note 171, 901.
200. State law may well so provide. Such is the case in any state which has en-
acted section 4(d) of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act (RUPIA).
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 4(d) (1962). In non-RUPIA states one might
call this last year income requirement a "Q-trap."
201. See generally Flaherty, Conflicts of Interest Arising in the Two-Spouse Es-
tate Planning Context, EsT. GIFrs & T&. J. May-June 1982, at 17; Moore, supra note
171, 910; Strauss, supra note 1, at 79-80; see also J. MANNING, supra note 81, at 34-
35 (criteria for selecting formulas); Dobris, Postmortem Tax Planning, supra note
32, at 290-321.
202. Questions can arise at both the planning stage and during an estate
administration.
tal deduction had to make a generous provision for their
spouses. 203 The QTI provisions allow a marital deduction for a
mere income interest.204 An attorney has a duty to provide advice
as well as technical services 205 and the author believes that all
concerned are best served when lawyers advise testators to be
generous with their spouses. 206
The availability of the income-only QTI might create a conflict
of interest between spouses at the drafting stage.207 If it does not
create a conflict of interest, it at least does create a question of
legal etiquette. 208 The spread between the minimum QTI and an
outright gift is very great. Therefore, the lawyer may wish to ini-
tially address the question of the marital deduction in a separate
conference with the wealthier spouse.209 However, once the
wealthier spouse picks the marital deduction format, the same
lawyer should be able to represent both spouses in most
situations. 210
The QTI can also create conflicts of interest after the client
dies.21l Virtually all of these will involve conflicts between bene-
ficiaries. 212 Under particular circumstances the QT[ election can
affect beneficial interests.213 The attorney representing the exec-
utor must alert the executor to this problem. The attorney must
203. See supra note 155.
204. LR.C. § 2056(b) (7) (Supp. V 1981).
205. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 2.1 (Proposed Final
Draft 1982); see also supra text accompanying note 164.
206. See generally Kahn & Gallo, The Widow's Election: A Return to Fundamen-
tals, 24 STAN. L REV. 531 (1972).
207. CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ESTATE PLANNING FOR TME
GENERAL PRACTITIONER §§ 2.14-.25 (1970); Kahn & Gallo, supra note 207; Flaherty,
supra note 201; Strauss, supra note 1, at 79-80.
208. One commentator sees a duty of disclosure of QTI planning to both
spouses. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 80.
209. See Kahn & Gallo, supra note 206.
210. See generally sources cited supra note 207; see also Miller, Functions and
Ethical Problems of the Lawyer in Drafting a Will, 1950 U. ILi LF. 415.
211. See Moore, supra note 171, 910; Strauss, supra note 1, at 79-80; see also
Brackney, supra note 32; Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Le-
gal Profession, 94 HARv. L REV. 1244 (1981).
212. See J. MANNmG, supra note 81, at 35.
213. The QTI election can effect the timing of paying death taxes, the amount of
death taxes paid, and the sources from which the death taxes are paid. Thus, the
potential will often exist for rearrangement of beneficial interests (to one degree
or another) by the exercise or nonexercise of the election power. See generally
Dobris, Postmorten Tax Planning, supra note 32 (discussion of how elections may
change the size of marital deduction gifts).
To the extent that the executor of the first spouse to die chooses to pay any
taxes by way of QTI election, less money is devoted to the surviving spouse, and
whoever bears the cost of death taxes in the first estate receives fewer dollars.
If the executor of the first spouse to die chooses to reduce the death taxes to
zero, when the surviving spouse dies the QTI remainder beneficiaries pay tax on
the QTI at the surviving spouse's marginal rate, unless the surviving spouse
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also make it abundantly clear to the beneficiaries that she does
not represent them. 214 This avoids the risk of the lawyer for the
executor entering into a de facto representation of the benefi-
ciaries who have by hypothesis conflicting interests.Zl This also
has the effect of making the beneficiaries aware that they must
obtain separate counsel if they are dissatisfied with the executor's
QTI election.2 16
SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
The unlimited marital deduction also affects drafting for the si-
multaneous death of both spouses. 217 Simultaneous death is, for
purposes of this article, the situation in which husband and wife
die simultaneously or under circumstances which make it impos-
chooses to exonerate the remainder interest from that tax out of his own assets.
IR.C. § 2207A (Supp. V 1981).
Who is harmed by postponement is a function of too many variables to allow for
generalization. The variables include the terms of the particular QTI trust, the es-
tate tax brackets of both spouses, the amount left in the QTI trust at the death of
the survivor, and the identity of the nonmarital beneficiaries in the first spouse's
estate. All contribute to the "answer" in a particular case. There is no doubt that,
given the right set of circumstances, the QTI election could enhance one benefici-
ary at a cost to another. See Moore, supra note 171, % 910.
Because there may be conflicting interests between beneficiaries, the lawyer
will want to clarify for her fiduciary client the problems that may exist. The law-
yer will also want to be sure that no beneficiary relies on the lawyer because of
the potential conflict.
These problems are exacerbated if the fiduciary is a beneficiary. Then the
fiduciary will have a personal conflict of interest and the question will not simply
be one of impartial exercise of a management power by a disinterested fiduciary.
See Mueller v. Mueller, 28 Wis. 2d 26, 135 N.W.2d 854 (1965).
Resolution of these problems will involve accommodating the duty of impartial-
ity, the duty to maximize estate assets by minimizing taxes, and the duty to act
with minimal skill. Moreover, part of the answer depends upon to whom one be-
lieves the first spouse's executor owes a duty. Is it to the couple as a financial unit
or is it (as is more likely) to the beneficiaries of the first spouse's estate? These
questions are further complicated by the fact that there are no equitable adjust-
ments for impositions made by the inequitable impact of death taxes. Dobris,
Postmortem Tax Planning, supra note 32.
214. See generally Comment, Considerations of Professional Responsibility in
Probate Matters, 51 NEB. I. REV. 456 (1972) (discussion of ethics in estate
administration).
215. See ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACED BY THE ESTATE PRACTITIONER, PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 115 (N. Galston ed. 1977).
216. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 211 (an encyclopedia-
like discussion of conflicts which omits discussion of the estates practice);
Midonick, Attorney-Client Conflicts and Confidences in Thusts and Estates, 35 REC.
A.B. Crry N.Y. 215 (1980).
217. See Ascher & Kartiganer, supra note 1, at 7. See generally R. COVEY, supra
note 1, at 195-99; J. PRICE, supra note 5, §§ 5.12, at 244-45.
sible to determine which one died first.218 For simplicity's sake
assume a testamentary transfer. If the testator and the expectant
legatee die simultaneously 19 then the law presumes the legatee
died first,22 0 and he then loses the gift under the common law doc-
trine of lapse.221 Thus, if H leaves property to W, she (or more
accurately, her estate) will lose the gift.= And if W leaves prop-
erty to H, then he (or more accurately, his estate) will lose the
gift.22 3 This presumption can cost an estate the marital deduc-
tion.2 24 Without more, this loss of the marital deduction may cost
the couple as a financial unit extra death taxes.225 This is so be-
cause the couple loses the opportunity to equalize estate tax
brackets in the estates via a marital deduction transfer.22 6 Thus
the drafter may want to reverse the presumption, in whole or in
part, to save taxes.22 7
There is an ideal disposition, from a tax viewpoint, when there
are simultaneous deaths.i The drafter would use the credit
shelter in both estates= and then equalize both sets of estate tax
brackets by a marital deduction transfer to the "poorer"
spouse.23 0 The careful lawyer might also draft to avoid the cost of
administering assets in both estates.3 1 Finally, the drafter might
well choose a disposition which both secures the marital deduc-
tion and allows the property to pass under the terms of the
wealthier spouse's will. 232
218. See Uniform Simultaneous Death Act § 2 (1953).
219. If transferor and transferee die simultaneously or under such circum-
stances as to make it impossible to determine who predeceased whom, then the
transferor is deemed to have survived the transferee, thereby depriving the trans-
feree of the property (and perhaps the transferor of the marital deduction). Most
estate planners choose to reverse this rule of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
in order to preserve the marital deduction. See generally id.
220. Id.
221. T. ATKimSoN, supra note 125, at 777-83.
222. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1972).
223. Id.
224. See generally J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.12, at 244-45; R. COVEY, supra note
1, at 195-99.
225. J. PRICE, mupra note 5, § 5.13.
226. See Ascher & Kartiganer, supra note 1, at 7-8.
227. For a sample of such language, see UNrrED STATES TnusT COMPANY OF
NEW YORK, supra note 98, at 23.
228. The same disposition would also be useful for close order deaths. See
Keydel, supra note 138, at 38.
229. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, §§ 5.22-.25.
230. See id.
231. See J. MANNING, supra note 106, at 72.
232. Such might well be the combined effect of Articles Tenth and Eighteenth
of the form of will in Tweed and Parsons. See H. TWEED & W. PARSONS, upra note
45, at 117-19, 125. With the spouse dead, the advantages of deferral of death taxes
via the marital deduction are gone. Therefore, it may not make sense to use the
unlimited marital deduction past the point of using the deemed survivor's credit
shelter and lower estate tax bracket. If there is a simultaneous death the wealth-
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There are three ways to accomplish these goals. They are
formula equalization clauses,23 3 partial disclaimers by the poorer
spouse's executor, 4 and partial QTI elections.23 5
Partial QTI elections, now clearly permissible,23 6 are an attrac-
tive tool for fine tuning in simultaneous death situations.237 They
appear to be simple both to draft=8 and administer, and the QTI
election can be delayed until nine months after the first death.239
Equalization clauses and executor disclaimers are available but
are arguably less attractive than QTI elections. 240 Formula equal-
ization clauses for simultaneous death situations are too cumber-
some.24 ' Executor disclaimer of the marital gift will clearly create
problems of fiduciary duty if the two wills have different
legatees. 242
ier spouse's estate should be allocated, through precise drafting, first to his or her
own credit shelter bypass, second to the deemed survivor's credit shelter (using a
trust in the deemed first decedent's estate so the property does not actually pass
through the deemed survivor's estate, or become subject to his/her control), and
third to the deemed survivor's estate in an amount sufficient to put the two estates
into the same estate tax bracket (again using a trust in the deemed first dece-
dent's estate to avoid second probate, etc.). To summarize, it may make sense to
roughly equalize the estate tax brackets in the event of simultaneous deaths.
If the survivor lives for six months, the "ideal" will might then provide a further
bequest to take advantage of the unlimited marital deduction in order to obtain
the benefits of tax deferral.
Obviously, postmortem planning through disclaimers by the deemed spouse's
estate, or partial QTI elections by the deemed predeceasing spouse's executor,
will provide the desired results in a less cumbersome fashion, and the QTI elec-
tion can be made up to nine months after death.
233. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.23.
234. See generally Saunders & Jackson, Renunciation of Gifts and Bequests:
New Law Clears Up Some But Not All of the Problems, 6 EsT. PLAN. 24, 24 (1979)
(an overview of disclaimers).
235. See generally Brackney, supra note 32 (discussion of partial QTI elections
as a postmortem planning tool).
236. See TMD. 7833, 1982-43 LR.B. 802 (promulgating Temp. Reg. § 22.5056-1
(1982)).
237. See generally Brackney, supra note 32 (discussion of postmortem planning
after ERTA).
238. Essentially, no sophisticated drafting is required to create a QTI trust and
once the trust is created the election is automatically available under the Internal
Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 2056(b) (7) (Supp. V 1981).
239. See Brackney, supra note 32.
240. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 1, at 21; Blattmachr & Lustgarten,
supra note 16, at 43-44.
241. The statement in the text is subjective and assumes an equalization clause
for simultaneous death purposes only. See generally J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.2
(history of marital deductions).
242. The surviving spouse's executor may be under a fiduciary duty to disclaim
no property unless the beneficiaries are the same under both wills or he is spebifi-
ESTATE PLANNING: EMERGING PATTERNS OF DIsPosITION243
Although estate planning experience is still somewhat limited
under ERTA, and the long-range effects have yet to be deter-
mined, estate planning patterns are emerging.A4 Which patterns
are most effective for tax saving purposes depends in large part
upon the size of the estate.245 One relates estate size first to the
amount of the unified credit.24 Estates fall into three rough cate-
gories. The first is the modest estate--one in which the combined
assets of both spouses are less than the amount of the unified
credit.247 That is, for purposes of this article, a modest estate is
one in which, if all of the first spouse's property goes outright to
the survivor, the survivor will still incur no estate tax liability on
death.248
In 1983 a husband with $275,000 who wants to leave it outright to
his wife (who, let us assume, has no assets of her own) need not
worry about bypass planning249 or the credit shelter.250 An out-
right gift to her will qualify for the unlimited marital deduction
and will "waste" his credit shelter.25 ' However, it will not matter
because when she dies the $275,000 will undoubtedly be protected
by her credit shelter.25 2 Inflation of that $275,000 is most unlikely
to keep pace with the increase in the credit shelter over the next
four years.25 3
In contrast, if a husband has $400,000 in 1983, there would be
some tax risk in leaving all his property to his wife. Her estate
would incur an estate tax unless she survived until 1985 when her
credit shelter would cover the $400,000.2-%
If that risk is a concern, as where, for example, the clients are
cally authorized to disclaim even if he changes beneficial interests under the sur-
vivor's will. In this particular context, the QTI election seems the superior tool.
243. Estates lawyers like to know and use the generally accepted dispositive
patterns. See Trachtman, supra note 7.
244. Underlying the discussion in the text is the assumption that the tangible
personal property and residential realty have been specifically given to the surviv-
ing spouse.
245. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 155, at 516.
246. See generally LR.C. § 2010 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
247. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 155, at 516.
248. It is a strange world we live in. In 1982 a modest estate was $225,000. By
1987 a modest estate will be $600,000.
249. See generally H. WENsTocK, supra note 1, §§ 5.1-.14 (discussion of bypass
planning).
250. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 16, at 39.
251. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.25.
252. Id.
253. See Backman & Frank, supra note 79, at 197.
254. See L.RC. § 2010 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In 1985 her credit shelter would be
$400,000.
[voL. 20: 801, 1983] Marital Deduction Estate Planning
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
older, then some credit shelter planning may be in order. 55 In
other words, the question is: Will both spouses die before the
unified credit increases to cover the family property?2 56 The
probability of a "yes" answer may justify the increased cost and
complexity of drafting a trust to take advantage of the first
spouse's credit shelter.25 7
It is appropriate to turn next to the second category of estate.
Recall that the three categories are a function of estate size as re-
lated to the credit shelter amount. Using 1987 figures, the next
category consists of estates in the $600,000 to $1,200,000 range.25 8
It seems useful to call them medium-size estates.259 They require
more thought.260 In such estates, with careful planning, no estate
tax need be paid at either death-in 1987.261 More specifically, the
drafter can use both spouses' credit shelters in conjunction with
the unlimited marital deduction in the first spouse's estate.26 2
An example will illustrate the point. Assume it is 1987 and H
has 1.2 million dollars, and W again has nothing.263 If H prede-
ceases W, the first $600,000 can go into a credit shelter trust and
the second $600,000 can pass under the unlimited marital deduc-
tion.26 4 The husband's estate will have zero tax liability because
of the combined effect of the credit shelter and the marital deduc-
255. See Blattmachr & Lustgarten, supra note 16, at 39.
256. See generally LR.C. § 2010 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
257. The discussion in the text assumes the wealthier spouse dies first. If not,
the family could lose the marital deduction. The solution is gifts to the "poorer"
spouse during life which take advantage of the unlimited gift tax marital deduc-
tion and which are designed to use the poorer spouse's credit shelter at death. See
generally Case, supra note 43.
258. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 155, at 516.
259. See, e.g., id.
260. Id. at 517.
261. Id. at 517, 543-45.
262. It can be said that it is socially unwholesome to have a tax system which
taxes or fails to tax owners of medium-sized estates as a function of whether or
not they get good lawyers. Trusts still work their tax magic, but as Professor
Maudsley wrote in another context, "Clearly, the great days of using trusts for
avoiding taxes on capital have gone forever." I. HANBURY & R. MAUDSLEY, MOD-
ERN EQurry vi (10th ed. 1976).
263. The example in the text is stark, unrealistic and over-simplified. It is, how-
ever, a classic hypothetical. In our society, marriage patterns and mortality pat-
terns suggest that husbands do indeed die first. And, in our society, husbands
often have more property of the marriage in their names than wives do. This is
not the case, of course, in community property states. And one assumes it is less
the case in newer marriages.
264. See generally J. PRICE, supra note 5, §§ 5.22-.25 (tax plan objectives).
tion.265 The wife's estate, that is the $600,000 legacy from the hus-
band, will also generate zero estate tax liability.266 It will be
completely within her credit shelter.
These two gifts-the credit shelter gift and the marital gift-can
be made in a number of ways. Several drafting patterns have
emerged.267 They involve either postmortem planning268 or
formula provisions. 269
Drafting patterns which rely on postmortem planning are cur-
rently attracting considerable interest.270 The first pattern relying
on postmortem planning gives the residuary outright to the sur-
viving spouse.271 It is followed by a "disclaimer" trust also for her
benefit;272 that is, the wife rejects a portion of the outright gift to
her.273 Under the terms of H's will the property so disclaimed
goes into the disclaimer trust. However, she is given no power
over the trust which will cause it to be taxed in her estate under
the proposed disclaimer regulations. 274
This plan depends on the surviving spouse disclaiming the
credit shelter amount.275 This disclaiming of an amount equal to
the decedent's credit shelter equivalent takes full advantage of
the opportunity to transfer property free of estate tax in the first
spouse's estate.276 The more the disclaimer trust provides for the
surviving spouse, the more likely she is to disclaim the appropri-
265. See generally id.
266. The $600,000 will pass tax free under the wife's credit shelter. This as-
sumes no inflation of the $600,000. See Backman & Frank, supra note 79, at 197.
267. The wise drafter will try to stay as close as possible to traditional drafting
patterns. This allows her to build on a base of prior doctrine. She will also adopt
standard patterns of disposition. This will provide access to a useful body of cases
and commentary that will emerge. See generally Trachtman, supra note 7 (a brief
for common sense in estate planning).
268. See generally Brackney, supra note 32.
269. See generally Cornfeld, Unlimited Marital Deduction, supra note 28,
1703-1704.5.
270. The attraction of drafting based on postmortem planning is the flexibility
and the ability to postpone decisions until the dust settles.
271. This pattern is discussed first for several reasons. It is the simplest to
draft, explain, and administer. It is the least imprinted with tax oriented complex-
ities. That is, it comes the closest to leaving everything to the surviving spouse
that a tax-oriented lawyer can endorse. It is the disposition the author would most
like to receive. And it is the most "modern" of the dispositive patterns.
272. See generally Melvoin, supra note 173 (a general discussion of
disclaimers).
273. This can be done under LR.C. § 2518(c) (1) (1976). See generally Melvoin,
supra note 173; Saunders & Jackson, supra note 234.
274. See Proposed Regs. § 25.2518-3. See generally J. PRICE, supra note 5,
§ 12.28-.29 (disclaimer of partial interest and planning).
275. See generally Hirschson, Qualified Disclaimers: The Key to Estate Plan-
ning Flexibility, EsT. Gurs & TA. J., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 4.
276. Id. at 8.
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ate amount.27 7 These provisions are suitable for the testator who
is only creating a trust for tax purposes.
The second pattern consists of transferring the residuary to a
generous QTI trust with provision for spousal disclaimer into a
generous credit shelter trust.278 This is similar to the first disposi-
tive pattern except that the survivor's marital deduction gift is
held in trust instead of being given outright. Again, obtaining the
credit shelter in the first spouse's estate is a function of post-
mortem planning which relies on the survivor's disclaimer.279
The third pattern relies for flexibility on the first spouse's exec-
utor rather than on the surviving spouse. The testator leaves the
entire residuary to a single QTI trust, relying on the executor to
make only a partial QTI election with the balance constituting the
credit shelter share.280 Now that it is clear that the partial QTI
election is available,28 1 it should become a standard, though some-
what limited, tool.282 The attraction is simplicity and access to
postmortem flexibility.
The next two patterns involve the use of pecuniary formula
gifts in the medium sized estate.283 There are several variables
which will complicate this discussion. The variables include the
size of the estate,2 4 the size of the unified credit,28 5 and the ques-
tion of which gift is to bepecuniary.286 Beginning in 1987 the size
of the estate will dictate which gift is to be the pecuniary gift.
That is, most drafters have as a goal a normal administration-an
estate with a substantial residuary estate.28 7 Thus, in larger es-
tates the pecuniary would be the credit shelter gift and in smaller
estates it would be the marital deduction gift in order to obtain a
277. Id.
278. See ILR.C. § 2518(c) (1) (1976); Ascher & Kartiganer, supra note 1, at 4, 6-7.
279. See generally L. NEWMAN & A. KALTER, POSTMORTEM ESTATE PLANNING 11-
47 (1976) (an excellent discussion of the principles and techniques of postmortem
planning).
280. See, e.g., UNITED STATES TRuST CoMPANY OF NE W YoR, supra note 98, at
29, 67-68; Ascher & Kartiganer, supra note 1, at 4.
281. See T.D. 7833, 1982-43 LRB. 802 (promulgating Temp. Reg. § 21-2056-1
(1982)).
282. The limitations are discussed in UNITED STATES TRUST CoMPANY OF NEW
YORK, supra note 1, at 1-2.
283. See Peckham, supra note 155, at 516.
284. See generally ic
285. See generally LIC. § 2010 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
286. Post-ERTA it can make sense for either the credit shelter gift or the mari-
tal deduction gift to be the pecuniary.
287. See UNrED STATES TRUST CoMPANY OF NE W YORK, supra note 1, at 14.
normal administration with a substantial residuary estate.288
However, during the ERTA phase-in period the credit shelter is
a loose cannon on deck. Initially, in 1982, it was an easy to fund
$225,000.289 The amount increases annually and by 1987 the
$600,000 credit shelter can present dramatic funding problems for
the executor of many medium-sized estates, for example in the
$800,000 range.2 90 Conversely, in this size estate, if the marital
share is chosen as the pecuniary gift it could present funding
problems in the early years but not in the later years.29 1
A simple example using the $800,000 estate will illustrate. For
decedents dying in 1987 the pecuniary marital deduction gift
would be no higher than $200,000 because most of the estate will
go to the credit shelter trust. Two hundred thousand dollars is a
very manageable pecuniary bequest in an $800,000 estate.292 How-
ever, if the hypothetical $800,000 testator died in 1983, the pecuni-
ary marital gift would be much larger because the unified credit
would still be comparatively small.2 93 The potential funding
problems are such that drafters may choose to use a fractional
formula in this size estate through the ERTA phase-in period.294
The final pattern is a standard fractional division of the entire
residuary estate into a credit shelter portion and a marital deduc-
tion portion.295 The credit shelter gift might well be a sprinkle
trust.2 96 The marital legacy could either be given outright297 or in
a generous QTI trust. For simplicity the formula would define the
credit shelter gift.298
Drafting for large estates-those over $1,200,000-is similar in
many respects to drafting for moderate estates. As discussed, a
tax on the first estate can be eliminated by combined use of the
unified credit and the unlimited marital deduction2 99 Or it might
be preferable to incur some tax in the first estate in order to use
288. See id.
289. LRC. § 2010 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
290. See Peckham, supra note 155, at 544.
291. See UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YoR, supra note 1, at 5-6, 14.
292. See generally Durand, supra note 1 (a discussion of the administrative
problems created by pecuniaries).
293. The pecuniary marital gift could be as high as $525,000. This would still be
manageable, but more skill might be required. See generally id.
294. See UNrTED STATES TRUST CoMPANY OF NEW YoR, upra note 1, at 14.
295. See, e.g., UNITED STATES TRusT CoMPANY OF NEW YoRK, supra note 98, at
46.
296. See generally, Wormser, .supra note 31, 68.500 (a discussion of the obliga-
tions of the sprinkling trustee).
297. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.44, at 291.
298. The credit shelter fraction is easier to express because it is a function of
the unified credit shelter, a known figure.
299. See generally Garlock, supra note 59 (a brief for prepaying taxes on larger
estates).
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the first spouse's lower tax brackets.300 However, the basic as-
sumption of this discussion is reduce-to-zero planning. Most of
the drafting patterns suitable for the medium-sized estate are ap-
propriate for a large estate also. A pecuniary formula marital be-
quest is not suitable, however. 01 A credit shelter residuary
would be a disproportionately small part of a large estate. A dis-
proportionately large marital pecuniary formula gift would be dif-
ficult to fund.302 And any decline in the value of the estate's
assets during administration would be completely absorbed by
the relatively small residuary. 03
The author's personal choice in very large estates would be as
follows-a formula, pecuniary, credit shelter disposition,30 4 fol-
lowed by a residuary marital deduction gift, with further provi-
sion for a disclaimer trust in the event that the surviving spouse
chooses to partially disclaim the marital gift to prepay taxes. 05 In
medium-sized estates, because of the dramatic shift in the credit
shelter amount during the next few years, the author would rely
on postmortem planning at least until 1987. Alternatively, in me-
dium-sized estates, at least during the phase-in period, the au-
thor's somewhat reluctant conclusion is that the safest pattern is
the standard fractional formula. The choice of the fractional dis-
position eliminates the problem which the increasing credit shel-
ter amount presents in the medium-sized estate when a
pecuniary gift is used. The reluctance is due to the complexity as-
sociated with administering fractional marital deduction
bequests. 06
300. See, e.g., Harris, Optimal Use of the Unlimited Estate Tax Marital Deduc-
tion, EST. Gurs & TR. J., May-June 1982, at 13.
301. See UNITED STATES TRUST CoMPANY OF NEW YORK, supra note 1, at 5-6, 14.
302. See Durand, supra note 1. It might also create unnecessary capital gains
on funding.
303. The statements in the text are simplified for purposes of illustration. The
smaller estates in the large-estate range will not dramatically differ from the larger
estates in the medium-estate range. Pecuniary maritals will not overhang large
estates until they start to fall into the two, three, four million dollar range. This is
obviously a continuum on which the pecuniary legacy becomes progressively more
burdensome as the size of the estate increases. The residuary credit shelter trust
will never be $600,000 because of debts and expenses and perhaps because of state
death taxes. At the lower end of the large estate range the pecuniary marital will
not overhang the estate to the extent it will in larger estates.
304. See J. PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.34.
305. The surviving spouse might also disclaim to allow property to fall into the
disclaimer trust to benefit the beneficiaries of that trust.
306. See UNITED STATES TRusT CoMPANY OF NEW YoRK, supra note 1, at 14. The
CONCLUSION
Post-ERTA estate planning relies substantially on modifications
of preexisting principles and patterns. The thoughtful drafter can
accommodate herself to the latest tax reform with a modicum of
effort.30 7
choice is "reluctant" because of the complexities of fractional dispositions. J.
PRICE, supra note 5, § 5.48. See generally Kurtz, .supra note 1.
307. The author would like to end this paper, as he began it, with a quote from
Professor Maudsley. In his introduction to the tenth edition of MODERN EQurry,
Professor Maudsley wrote "of the respect and affection in which... [Professor
Hanbury was] held by generations of friends and pupils." Let the same be said of
Professor Maudsley as well. . HANBURY & . MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQuTrY vii
(10th ed. 1976).
